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Gender Differences in Entrepreneurial Choice and Risk Aversion 




DIW Berlin, 10108 Berlin, Germany 






Why are female entrepreneurs so rare? Women have both to a lower entry rate into self-
employment  and  a  higher  exit  rate  in  Germany.  To  explain  the  gender  gap,  a  structural 
microeconometric model of the transition rates is estimated, which includes a standard risk 
aversion parameter. As inputs into the model, the expected value and variance of earnings 
from  self-employment  and  dependent  employment  are  estimated  separately  by  gender, 
accounting for non-random selection into the employment states. The gender differential in 
the transition rates is decomposed using a novel extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca technique 
for nonlinear models. Women’s higher estimated risk aversion is found to explain the largest 
part of their higher exit rate, but only a small part of their lower entry rate. 
 
JEL classification: J23, J16, D81 
Keywords:  Entrepreneurship,  Self-Employment,  Risk  Aversion,  Gender  Differential, 
Nonlinear Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition 
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1  Introduction 
In almost all OECD countries, the share of the self-employed in all employed is much lower 
among women than among men. The OECD averages were 18.3 % among men and only 
13.4 % among women in 2007, according to the OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics. In 
Germany, where the overall self-employment rate is lower, the respective shares were 14.4 % 
versus 9.2 % (Figure 1).
2 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The large gender difference in self-employment rates is puzzling, considering that there 
are reasons why self-employment may even be more attractive for women. If the well-known 
wage differential between men and women in dependent employment is partly explained by 
employer discrimination in hiring and promoting decisions, women could escape these forms 
of discrimination by choosing self-employment. Moreover, the greater flexibility with regard 
to  the  timing  and  location  of  work  in  self-employment  may  make  self-employment 
comparably better combinable with child care (Budig, 2006). 
The lower self-employment rate among women may be explained by discrimination from 
creditors  and  consumers  against  self-employed  women,  which  may  have  more  severe 
consequences than employer discrimination.
3 Higher risk aversion of women may be another 
explanation, as earnings of the self-employed are much more volatile than those of employees 
with comparable characteristics (Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Borjas and Bronars, 1989). From 
the literature we have considerable evidence that women are more risk averse than men (e.g. 
Dohmen et al., forthcoming; Borghans et al., 2009; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009).  
                                                 
2 Only in Mexico and Turkey are the female self-employment shares higher than the male shares, which may be 
explained by a large number of small agricultural establishments. See Blanchflower (2000) for more information 
on self-employment in OECD countries, including the lower female self-employment rate. 
3 Credit constraints for entrepreneurs have been discussed intensively in the literature (e.g. Hurst and Lusardi, 
2004; Disney and Gathergood, 2009). It is thus plausible to think that they may be more severe for women 
entrepreneurs.  Borjas  and  Bronars  (1989)  discuss  consumer  discrimination  in  the  context  of  self-employed 
African-Americans.   3 
A method often applied to study gender differences is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
approach with its variations. Georgellis and Wall (2005) used the Blinder-Oaxaca technique 
for logit models to analyze the lower female transition rate from salaried employment into 
self-employment.  Fairlie  (1999)  applied  the  same  method  to  decompose  the  gap  between 
African-Americans  and  whites  in  self-employment  in  the  U.S.A..  In  these  studies,  the 
potential role of differences in risk preferences is not taken into account, however, and cannot 
be separated from potential lending or consumer discrimination, as explicitly acknowledged 
by Fairlie (1999, page 97).
4 
This paper contributes to the explanation of the gender difference in self-employment by 
explicitly  considering  the  role  of  risk  aversion.  The  approach  is  to  estimate  a  structural 
microeconomeric model of entries into and exits out of self-employment, which includes the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) as a parameter. This allows 
decomposing the gender differentials in the transition rates into three components: differences 
in observed endowments; differences in the econometrically estimated level of risk aversion; 
and  differences  in  the  other  estimated  coefficients,  which  may  be  related  to  creditor  or 
consumer  discrimination.  This  decomposition  relies  on  a  novel  extension  of  the  Blinder-
Oaxaca technique for nonlinear models. 
The structural transition models estimated in this paper are related to work by Kanbur 
(1982) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), who modeled entrepreneurial choice as trading off 
risk  and  returns.  They  suggested  that  the  less  risk  averse  become  entrepreneurs  and  may 
receive  a  risk  premium  as  compensation  for  the  greater  variance  of  their  earnings.  The 
historical roots of these models are in the work of Knight (1921), according to whom the 
central role of the entrepreneur is to bear uncertainty. Recent empirical studies found evidence 
                                                 
4 Wagner (2007) analyzed the gender difference in nascent entrepreneurs based on a matching approach. He 
controlled for whether someone mentioned “fear of failure” as a reason for not starting an own business. While 
this is interesting, “fear of failure” is different from risk aversion, as it depends on the individual expected 
success probability.   4 
that risk attitudes play a significant role in the decisions to become and remain self-employed 
(Cramer et al., 2002; Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2008 and 2009). 
Thus, the microeconometric transition models take account of both the expected value 
and  the  variance  of  earnings  in  self-employment  and  dependent  employment.  In  the 
estimation  of  the  first  and  second  moments  of  gross  earnings,  I  control  for  non-random 
selection into the alternative employment states. Kunze (2005) pointed out the importance of 
selection in the analysis of gender differentials. As taxation has been shown to influence 
entrepreneurial choice (e.g. Schuetze, 2000; Bruce, 2002; Cullen and Gordon, 2007; Fossen 
and Steiner, 2009), net income is calculated from estimated gross income using an estimated 
tax function. Not only one period’s income, but lifetime income matters for the significant 
decision to enter or exit self-employment. This is taken into account by predicting the profiles 
of  the  future  expected  value  and  variance  of  net  earnings  over  each  individual’s  lifetime 
conditional on the choice to be self-employed or dependently employed. Annuities of these 
streams enter the structural transition model. 
Attempts to estimate a structural model of entrepreneurial choice incorporating earnings 
and risk have been very rare. Rees and Shah (1986) formulated a model of the probability of 
being self-employed assuming a CRRA utility function, but used a simplified model without 
an explicit risk parameter in the estimation. Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (1992) specified a similar 
model  and  actually  estimated  its  parameters  using  the  first  waves  of  the  German  Socio-
Economic Panel. The model did not allow for individual differences in the level of earnings 
risk, however. Rosen and Willen (2002) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and found 
that in comparison to wage employment, self-employment both comes with an increase in 
mean yearly consumption and an increased variance of returns, which is consistent with a risk 
premium for the self-employed.
5 
                                                 
5 Rosen and Willen (2002) used the measured level and variance of income in the two employment states to 
asses a theoretical model of self-employment choice, but came to the conclusion that the risk premium was too   5 
The results obtained in this paper from estimating the transitions models indicate risk 
aversion  and  confirm  the  theoretical  presumptions:  Higher  expected  net  earnings  in  self-
employment relative to dependent employment are found to attract people to become and to 
remain entrepreneurs, whereas higher variance discourages them from choosing this option. 
Women are found to be more risk averse than men, which is consistent with the literature. The 
decomposition of the gender differentials in the transition rates yields that women’s higher 
estimated  risk  aversion  explains  the  largest  part  of  their  higher  exit  rate  out  of  self-
employment, but only a small part of their lower entry rate. 
Section 2 of this paper develops the structural transition model. It is translated into an 
empirical discrete time hazard rate model in section 3.1. Section 3.2 briefly introduces the 
data. The methodology for the estimation of lifetime annuities of the expected value and the 
variance  of  net  earnings,  controlling  for  selection,  is  described  in  section  3.3.  Section  4 
presents  the  estimation  results  of  the  model,  along  with  a  sensitivity  analysis,  and  the 
decomposition of the gender differential in the estimated transition rates. Section 5 concludes. 
2  The Structural Transition Model 
To analyze entrepreneurial choice,  I model the  decision to switch between the two states 
dependent employment and self-employment in a discrete time hazard rate framework.
6 This 
allows  consistently  taking  into  account  duration  dependence.
7  Transitions  from  dependent 
employment  to  self-employment  (entry  model)  and  transitions  from  self-employment  to 
                                                                                                                                                         
large to be rationalized by conventional  measures of risk aversion. A possible explanation  may be that the 
authors used yearly income and did not take into account that the self-employed work more weekly hours on 
average than wage employees. A related stream of literature has analyzed the earnings differential between self-
employment and dependent employment, without considering the difference in the variance of earnings. These 
studies include Fraser and Greene (2006) and Taylor (1996), who confirmed that higher expected earnings in 
self-employment  relatively  to  paid  employment  significantly  increase  the  probability  of  becoming  self-
employed;  Hammarstedt  (2006),  who  established  the  same  result  for  Swedish  immigrants;  Dolton  and 
Makepeace (1990) and Rees and Shah (1986), who also found a positive, but insignificant effect; and Hamilton 
(2000), who in contrast concluded that factors other than earnings induce people to become self-employed. 
6 A similar model is used in Fossen (2009) to study the effect of income taxation on entrepreneurship. 
7 Entrepreneurial exit has been analyzed similarly based on hazard rate models by Evans and Leighton (1989), 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Taylor (1999), Tervo and Haapanen (2009), and Falck (2007), the latter using 
German establishment data.   6 
dependent employment (exit model) are specified analogously; in the following, the entry 
model is described. 
In a given period t, a dependently employed individual rationally chooses if he or she 
wants to remain dependently employed or switch to self-employment in the following period 
t+1. The agent will enter self-employment if his/her expected utility in self-employment (se) 
is higher than in dependent employment (e): 
E(Use(yi,se)) > E(Ue(yi,e)),   (1) 
where i is an index over observations in the pooled sample of the dependently employed, yi,se 
is a person’s current lifetime annuity of future net earnings from self-employment, starting 
from t+1, and yi,e is the lifetime annuity of future net wages from dependent employment. 
Both yi,se and yi,e are random variables because future income is risky. In this model, it is 
assumed  that  people  know  the  probability  distribution  of  their  future  income  in  both 
occupational states. The expected utility with respect to y is approximated by a second order 
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where my = E(y) and sy
2 = Var(y) and the subscripts of y are suppressed for simplicity. The 
equation demonstrates that E(U(y)) < U(E(y)) if agents are risk-averse (U´´(y)<0).
8  
The following assumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
9 This implies that the 
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8 This general result follows directly from Jensen’s inequality. 
9 Alternatively one could assume constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The advantage of CARA utility is that 
a closed form representation of expected utility exists if y is normally distributed, and no Taylor approximation 
is needed. The literature has preferred CRRA as the more realistic specification, however (in the context of 
entrepreneurship, cf. Kanbur, 1982; Rees and Shah, 1986; and Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier, 1992).   7 
where the constant r is the coefficient of CRRA (Pratt, 1964). The following random utility 
function satisfies the CRRA condition, yields increasing utility for money y>0, and allows 
utility  in  the  two  alternative  employment  states  jÎ{se;e}  to  vary  across  observations 
depending  on  observable  characteristics  and  covariates  xi,  the  duration  in  dependent 
employment di, and an error term eij:  
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The parameter  a >0 reflects the weight of the risk adjusted income  annuity in the utility 
function. This specification implies risk preference for r < 0, risk neutrality for r = 0 and risk 
aversion for r > 0. The error term eij captures unobservable tastes influencing utility. These 
tastes are unobservable for the researcher and thus treated as a random variable, but they are 
known  to  the  individuals  in  the  sample,  in  contrast  to  the  error  in  future  earnings  y. 
Unobserved  factors  influencing  utility  in  self-employment  might  include  the  desire  to  be 
independent (Taylor, 1996) or the believe in the power of one’s own  actions (Evans and 
Leighton, 1989). The function jj describes a possibly nonlinear influence of the spell duration 
in dependent employment on utility in each of the two states, for instance through habituation.  
The  vector  xi  controls  for  variables  that  emerged  as  important  determinants  of  self-
employment  in  prior  studies:  age,  education,  work  experience,  unemployment  experience, 
number  of  children,  region,  and  a  constant  (for  example,  see  Taylor,  1996;  Evans  and 
Leighton, 1989; for German data see Georgellis and Wall, 2005; Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 
2005).  Furthermore,  Parker  (2008)  and  Brown  et  al.  (2006)  found  evidence  that  an 
individual’s household context has an influence on the decision to be self-employed. This is 
accounted for by including the marital status, the spouse’s employment state, if applicable, 
and the income of other household members in xi. Section 4.3 includes a sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the control variables.   8 
The  first  and  second  order  partial  derivations  of  U  with  respect  to  y  (suppressing 
subscripts j and i) are 
1
( , , , ) ,
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For a >0 and my > 0, the equation implies that for risk-averse agents expected utility decreases 
with greater variance of earnings. Implicitly it is assumed that the market does not provide 
insurance against income risk, which is plausible given moral hazard and adverse selection. 
For risk-neutral agents the variance does not matter, and for risk-loving individuals, greater 
variance actually increases expected utility. Taking the expectation with respect to the random 
earnings variable y did not remove the utility error term e. 
As the agent chooses the employment state which gives him/her the highest utility, the 
probability that he/she decides to switch to entrepreneurship is 
Prob(transi = 1 | yi,se, yi,e, xi, di)  = Prob(E(Use(yi,se, xi, di, ei,se)) > E(Ue(yi,e, xi, di, ei,e))) 
= Prob(ei,e-ei,se < a(V(yi,se) - V(yi,e)) + (bse-be)´xi + j se(di) - j e(di)) 
= F(a(V(yi,se)-V(yi,e)) + b´xi + j se(di) - j e(di)),  (7) 
where transi is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if a transition to self-employment is 
observed  between  t  and  t+1,  and  0  otherwise;  b   =  bse  - be;  F  is  the  cumulative  density 





























V y   (8)   9 
can  be  interpreted  as  expected  risk  adjusted  income.  The  probability  of  remaining  in 
dependent employment is the complementary probability  
Prob(transi = 0 | yi,se, yi,e, xi, di) = 1 - Prob(transi = 1 | yi,se, yi,e, xi, di) = 1 - F(×).  (9) 
3  Empirical Methodology 
3.1  Specification of the Empirical Models 
In order to estimate the parameters of the structural transition models using the maximum 
likelihood method, it remains to specify the functions jj of the duration in employment state j 
and the cumulative density function F of the error terms ei = ei,e - ei,se in equation (7). The 
functional form of jj is specified as a cubic polynomial (higher order polynomials were not 
significant, see section 4.3): 
jj(di) = d1j di + d2j di
2 + d3j di
3.   (10) 
It follows that 
j(di) := j se(di) - j e(di) = d1 di + d2 di
2 + d3 di
3,   (11) 
where dk = dk,se - dk,e for k Î{1;2;3}. 
The log likelihood function for the sample of the dependently employed in the entry 
model can now be written as 
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Following McFadden’s (1974) random utility model, the error terms ei,e and ei,se are assumed 
to be independently and identically distributed, with the type I extreme value distribution. As 
McFadden  showed,  it  follows  that  F  is  the  cumulative  logistic  probability  distribution. 
Alternatively assuming that F is the cumulative normal distribution yields similar results (see 
section 4.3).   10 
As mentioned, the exit model based on the sample of the self-employed is specified 
exactly analogously to the entry model.
10 The entry and exit models are estimated jointly with 
the  same  structural  risk  aversion  parameter  r  in  both  models.  The  other  coefficients  are 
allowed to differ between the two models. 
Individuals can experience multiple spells in self-employment or dependent employment 
in the observation period. If the person-period observations i are indexed by person, spell 
number and spell duration d, the model can be written as a discrete time hazard rate model 
where the hazard rate lpk(d) is the probability that spell k of person p ends in period d, i.e. a 
transition  occurs,  conditional  on  survival  until  the  beginning  of  d.  The  function  j  is  the 
baseline  hazard  in  the  hazard  rate  model.  The  maximum  likelihood  method  allows 
consistently taking into account not only completed spells, but also both right-censored and 
left-censored  spells  in  the  estimation.  Right-censored  spells  contribute  to  the  likelihood 
function  through  equation  (9).  For  left-censored  spells  retrospective  employment  history 
information in the data make it possible to recover the spell duration d and to include these 
spells consistently in the likelihood function, too (cf. Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2008). 
Before the transition models can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function, the 
annuities of the expected value of net income, my, and its variance, sy
2, in the two alternative 
employment states are required for each individual in each period, as these statistics enter the 
likelihood function through V. The strategy for estimating my and sy
2 is described in section 
3.3, after the data basis of this analysis is shortly described in the next section. 
                                                 
10 The only difference is that the coefficient a of the risk-adjusted income differential (defined as the difference 
between self-employment and dependent employment in both models) is expected to be negative in the exit 
model. In the estimation of the parameters, a is left unconstrained, so a check if a has the expected sign in all 
models serves as a test for the models’ consistency.   11 
3.2  Data 
This analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) provided by the German 
Institute of Economic Research (DIW Berlin). The SOEP is a representative yearly panel 
survey  with  detailed  information  about  the  socio-economic  situation  of  10,000  to  25,000 
individuals  living  in  5,000  to  13,000  households  in  Germany.  This  analysis  draws  on  22 
waves, starting with the first one available, from 1984 to 2005.
11 Specific groups have been 
oversampled  in  the  SOEP,  especially  migrants  (since  1994)  and  high-income  households 
(since 2002). Sampling weights allow for population representative statistics. Wagner et al. 
(2007) provide a detailed description of the data. 
For  the  purpose  of  analyzing  transitions  between  employment  states,  the  sample  is 
restricted to individuals between 18 and 64 years of age and excludes farmers, civil servants, 
and  those  currently  in  education,  vocational  training,  or  military  service.  The  individuals 
excluded  presumably  have  a  limited  occupational  choice  set,  or  they  have  different 
determinants of earnings (e.g. subsidies in the case of farmers) and of occupational choice that 
could distort our analysis. Family members working for a self-employed relative are also 
excluded from the dataset because they are not entrepreneurs in the sense of running their own 
business. After removing observations with missing values for any of the relevant variables, 
117 321 person-year observations are left for the analysis. Table B 1 in Appendix B shows 
how  these  observations  are  distributed  over  the  possible  employment  states  dependent 
employment, self-employment, and unemployment or non-participation, further split by full-
time and part-time work (full-time is defined as a minimum of 35 hours per week) and gender. 
Working  individuals  are  classified  as  self-employed  or  dependently  employed  based  on 
whether they report self-employment or dependent employment as their primary activity. A 
transition can be identified in the data when a person is observed in different employment 
states in two consecutive years t and t+1. 
                                                 
11 The wave of 2005 is used to obtain retrospective income information for 2004 only.   12 
This paper focuses on the choice between full-time dependent employment and full-time 
self-employment, because the attention is on the comparison of earnings in the two alternative 
employment states, not on the decision to work full-time or part-time or the decision to work 
or not to work. Thus, as in Taylor (1996) and Rees and Shah (1986), the structural transition 
models are based on full-time working individuals. Part-time work and non-participation are 
much more relevant for women than for men in Germany, which is addressed in two ways. 
First,  a  two-step  procedure  controls  for  non-random  selection  into  the  full-time  working 
categories  (see  section  3.3).  Second,  in  a  robustness  check,  transitions  into  part-time 
dependent employment or self-employment are taken into account as well. The results remain 
largely unchanged (see section 4.3). 
In the sample of full-time working individuals, the unweighted (weighted) male self-
employment rate is 6.9 % (6.8 %), whereas the female rate is only 4.3 % (4.1 %). The yearly 
transition  rate  from  dependent  employment  into  self-employment  as  a  percentage  of  the 
dependently employed is 0.94 % (0.95 %) for men and 0.6 % (0.65 %) for women. The yearly 
transition rate from self-employment to dependent employment as a percentage of the self-
employed  is  7.5 %  (6.9 %)  for  men  and  7.9 %  (8.9 %)  for  women.  Thus,  the  lower  self-
employment rate among women is explained both by a lower entry rate and a higher exit rate, 
where the gender difference in the entry rate is much larger in relative terms. Table B 3 in 
Appendix  B  shows  descriptive  statistics  for  full-time  self-employed  and  dependently 
employed men  and  women in the sample.  For a description of the variables used in this 
analysis, see Table B 2. All monetary variables are deflated by the Consumer Price Index 
(2001 = 100). 
3.3  Estimation of Annuities of the Expected Value and the Variance of Net Earnings 
This section outlines the estimation strategy for the annuities of the expected value of net 
earnings my and the variance of net earnings sy
2 in the two alternative states self-employment   13 
and dependent employment. The estimations are conducted separately for men and women 
because of the well documented differences in male and female wage equations. 
A  two-step  procedure  is  applied  to  control  for  selection  effects  in  the  earnings  and 
variance regressions. People self-select into 5 possible employment states: full-time and part-
time  self-employment,  full-time  and  part-time  dependent  employment  and 
unemployment/inactivity. The probability of being observed in each of these 5 employment 



















,  (13) 
where gj are the coefficient vectors
12 and zi is the vector of regressors. This vector consist of 
the variables zi
earn used in the earnings regression (see below), excluding spell duration, and 
for identification, it additionally includes variables indicating a self-employed father,
13 the 
number of children, and the marital status.
14 The Hausman specification tests do not indicate a 
violation of the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives. After estimation of 
the  selection  model  an  individual  sample  selection  term  lij  is  calculated  for  the  two 
employment states of interest jÎ{se;e} (full-time), which enters the earnings and the variance 
equations (cf. Maddala, 1983, pp. 275-278). 
For each observation in the sample the expected net income must be estimated for the 
two alternative states self-employment and wage employment. Hourly gross earnings from 
dependent employment (using the sample of the full-time dependently employed) and from 
                                                 
12 gj is normalized to 0 for the base category j=”unemployment/inactivity” 
13 Having a self-employed father is used as an exclusion restriction as this characteristic is likely to have an 
impact on the probability of being self-employed (e.g. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), but is not expected to have 
an  influence  on  earnings  after  controlling  for  other  relevant  factors  (cp.  Taylor,  1996).  In  Germany,  self-
employed mothers were rare in the generation of most respondents’ parents, so only self-employed fathers are 
used. 
14 The number of children and marital status are well known to influence the decision to participate in the labor 
market and the choice between part-time and full-time work, especially for women, but are not expected to 
influence gross earnings (cp. Rees and Shah, 1986).   14 
self-employment (using the full-time self-employed) are regressed on a vector of demographic 
and human capital and work related variables zi
earn: 
q s l ¢ = + +
g earn
ij j i j ij ij y z u ,  (14) 
where  yij
g  are  hourly  gross  earnings
15  of  person-year  observation  i  in  employment  state 
jÎ{se;e}, qj is the coefficient vector, sjlij controls for selection (see above), and uij is the error 
term.  Conceptually,  human  capital  variables  clearly  determine  gross  earnings,  not  net 
earnings, as the latter depend on the tax legislation. Thus, gross earnings are estimated here, 
and net earnings are derived subsequently (see below). The variables vector zi
earn includes 
age, education, the duration of the spell in the current employment state, lifetime work and 
unemployment experience, region, and a constant. Moreover, as predictions of income enter 
the structural transition models, for identification some variables should be included in the 
earnings, but not in the transition equations. This paper follows Fraser and Greene (2006), 
Taylor (1996), and Rees and Shah (1986), by including industry dummies, which are well 
proven determinants of earnings, in zi
earn only.
16 
Additionally  to  the  expected  earnings,  the  variance  of  earnings  is  also  required  to 
estimate the transition models. The variance is estimated based on a flexible specification of a 
heteroscedasticity function. The natural logarithms of the squared residuals from the earnings 
estimation are regressed on the explanatory variables of the earnings model zi
earn and the 
selection term lij to control for selection, separately for the two employment states jÎ{se;e}: 
2 ˆ ln( ) p s l ¢ = + +
earn var
ij j i j ij ij u z e ,  (15) 
                                                 
15 Income information for year t is obtained from retrospective questions in wave t+1 about a respondent’s 
average monthly gross income in t, differentiated by income from dependent employment and self-employment. 
Income from self-employment (employment) is only averaged over months in which the respondent was actually 
self-employed (employed), so the information remains accurate if the respondent switched between employment 
states. Earnings levels rather than log(earnings) are used in the regression to avoid excluding people who report 
zero earnings,  which is sometimes observed for the self-employed during temporary periods (cp. Hamilton, 
2000). 
16  Additionally  dummy  variables  for  German  nationality  and  physical  handicap  are  added  to  the  earnings 
equations, as these variables turn out to be important for the prediction of earnings. Year dummies are also 
included to account for the business cycle.   15 
where eij is the error term.
17  In contrast to the estimation of a population parameter, this 
approach allows the predicted second moment of earnings to vary not only between the states 
self-employment  and  dependent  employment  and  by  gender,  but  also  with  individual 
characteristics and covariates, just like the predicted first moment. 
To derive net (after-tax) income from predicted gross income, the German progressive 
income tax schedule must be approximated. As the SOEP provides information about both a 










,  (16) 
where grossinci and netinci are gross and net income.
18 These tax rates ti, are regressed on a 
vector zi
tax of variables relevant for the tax code: 
t k¢ = +
tax
i i i z v ,  (17) 
where  k  is  the  coefficient  vector  and  vi  is  the  error  term  capturing  specifics  of  the  tax 
legislation  which  cannot  be  taken  into  account  in  this  approximation.
19  The  vector  zi
tax 
includes polynomials of the first, second and third degree of gross yearly income to model the 
non-linear  nature  of  the  tax  function,  a  “married”  dummy,  additionally  interacted  with  a 
“female” dummy (to account for the effect of income splitting), the number of children, a 
“disabled” dummy, and a “self-employed” dummy (to allow for differential tax treatment). 
After this tax function is estimated, it can be used to predict average tax rates conditional on 
the predicted gross incomes in both the true and the counter-factual employment states and on 
                                                 
17 To obtain consistent predictions for the squared residuals, the predicted values from the log model must be 
exponentiated and multiplied with the expected value of exp(eij). A consistent estimator for the expected value of 
exp(eij) is obtained from a regression of the squared residuals on the exponentiated predicted values from the log 
model through the origin. This procedure does not require normality of eij. 
18 Additionally to the retrospective income questions in the SOEP, respondents are asked to state their gross and 
net income in the month before the interview. It is assumed that this reflects average monthly income. Taxes are 
levied on yearly income, of course, but a multiplication of gross and net incomes by 12 (or some other factor) is 
irrelevant as it would cancel out in the tax rate formula (16). 
19 All working respondents, no matter if full-time or part-time, provide information that is used to estimate this 
tax function.   16 
individual  characteristics.
20  This  allows  deriving  the  expected  value  and  variance  of  net 
income in both alternatives. 
Not only one period’s net income, but lifetime net income matters for the significant 
decision to enter or exit self-employment. This is taken into account by predicting the profiles 
of  the  future  expected  value  and  variance  of  net  earnings  over  each  individual’s  lifetime 
conditional  on  the  choice  to  be  self-employed  or  dependently  employed.  Then  individual 




















,  (18) 
where  q  is  the  real  interest  rate  plus  one,
21  and  ni  is  the  number  of  remaining  years  of 
economic activity for observation i; the individual horizon is assumed to be reached at the age 
of 64. The difference between net income derived from actual gross income and net income 
derived from predicted gross income in an individual’s actual employment state ji in the year 
of observation is added to yij,k
net if j=ji, as this difference contains additional information about 
an  individual’s  productivity  in  state  ji.  An  annuity  of  income  variance  is  calculated 
analogously. 
4  Empirical Results 
4.1  Net Earnings and Variance Estimation 
After having estimated the gross earnings and variance equations (14) and (15), controlling 
for selection,
22 the expected value and the variance of gross earnings can be predicted for each 
                                                 
20 Predicted yij
g are hourly incomes, whereas the tax function requires yearly income. For the conversion, the 
average number of hours worked in the sample of full-time working people is used. 
21 The real interest rate is assumed to be 5%. The results are not sensitive to the choice of q within a reasonable 
range, see section 4.3. 
22 Table A 1 in Appendix A shows that the variables used as exclusion restrictions (fatherse, married, and 
nchild) are significant in the selection equation (13). The coefficient of the selectivity term l is negative in all 
earnings regressions (see Table A 2), which indicates that the error terms in the selection equation and the 
earnings equation (14) are negatively correlated. It is significant in the models of dependent employment only.   17 
individual in the two alternative states self-employment and dependent employment.
23 Using 
the estimated tax rate function (17), net earnings and their variance can be calculated.
24 The 
results from these estimations are summarized in Tables A 1 through A 4 in Appendix A. The 
predicted gross and net hourly income profiles over the duration of a spell in self-employment 
or dependent employment are plotted for self-employed men and women in Figure 2, and for 
dependently  employed  men  and  women  in  Figure  3  (at  the  mean  values  of  the  other 
explanatory variables). The net income profiles run below the corresponding gross income 
profiles (the gap is the tax paid), and they are also flatter, which reflects the progressive 
income tax in Germany. In each diagram, the income profiles in the actual employment state 
and in the  counter-factual employment state  can be directly  compared. For reference, the 
scatter  dots  mark  the  mean  gross  hourly  incomes  of  people  actually  observed  with  the 
respective spell duration. The numbers at the dots indicate how many observations with the 
respective spell duration are available in the sample. 
Figure 2 shows that on average, self-employed men would initially earn higher hourly 
gross  income  in  dependent  employment  than  in  self-employment,  but  self-employment  is 
rewarded  higher  for  them  after  about  15  years.  Net  income  is  higher  for  them  in  self-
employment almost from the beginning on. This finding supports the hypothesis that higher 
net earnings in self-employment induce the self-employed to choose this state. The picture is 
similar for self-employed women, although women have to endure a considerable period of 
slightly lower net earnings in self-employment before these exceed the counter-factual wages 
from dependent employment. 
                                                                                                                                                         
Insignificant and sometimes negative selection terms in regressions of earnings from self-employment are often 
reported in the literature (e.g. Rees and Shah, 1986; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Dolton and Makepeace, 1990; 
and Borjas and Bronars, 1989), suggesting that there is no significant selection on unobservables; Taylor (1996), 
in contrast, reports positive and significant selection effects. 
23 In the earnings variance regression (see Table A 3), the explanatory variables are jointly significant for both 
employment states and genders, which confirms the hypothesis that earnings are heteroscedastic (Breusch-Pagan 
test). This result shows that the variance of earnings not only differs between dependent employment and self-
employment and by gender, but also between individuals, depending on their characteristics and covariates. 
24 The results from the tax rate regression (see Table A 4) show that the individual average tax rate increases 
with gross income at diminishing rates, which reflects the progressive income tax code in Germany.   18 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Dependently employed people would on average earn more if they were self-employed, 
both in gross and in net terms, as Figure 3 shows. On its own, this finding could be interpreted 
as a sign indicating that earnings do not play a role in the choice of the employment state, or 
even of irrational behavior. The structural model developed in this paper offers a different 
explanation:  If  employees  do  not  only  have  a  higher  expected  value  of  earnings  in  the 
counter-factual state of self-employment, but also a higher variance of earnings, it may be 
rational for them to choose dependent employment if they are risk averse. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Figure  4  and  Figure  5  shed  light  on  the  variance  of  earnings  in  the  two  different 
employment states. For better comparability, the variation coefficient (the standard deviation 
over the mean) is plotted. Again, the profiles are predicted by varying the spell duration and 
keeping the explanatory variables fixed at their mean values, and the scatter dots indicate the 
actual  mean  variation  coefficients  of  earnings  at  the  respective  spell  durations.  The  four 
diagrams show that the variation coefficients of net earnings are smaller than those of gross 
earnings. This can be explained by the progressive income tax system in Germany. It can also 
be  observed  that  the  variation  coefficient  is  larger  in  self-employment  than  in  dependent 
employment for all groups, i.e. for actually self-employed and dependently employed men 
and women, and both before and after tax. The difference between the earnings variation in 
self-employment  and  dependent  employment  is  more  pronounced  for  those  actually 
dependently  employed  than  for  those  actually  self-employed.  Thus,  switching  to  self-
employment would require the dependently employed to tolerate a much higher earnings risk, 
and risk aversion could explain why employees do not switch to self-employment in spite of 
the higher expected value of earnings. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE   19 
4.2  Estimation Results of the Transition Models 
After the individual predicted net earnings and net variance profiles over time (till the age of 
64) are summarized as annuities (see section 3.3), the structural models of transition rates 
between the alternative employment states dependent employment and self-employment (7) 
can be estimated. Table 1 shows the coefficients resulting from the likelihood maximization 
with their heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets below. For each gender, the 
model of entry into self-employment from dependent employment is shown in the left and the 
model of exit from self-employment towards dependent employment in the right column. A 
positive  sign  of  a  coefficient  indicates  that  the  corresponding  variable  increases  the 
probability of a transition to the alternative employment state. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The  estimated  coefficient  of  CRRA  r  is  positive  and  significant  both  for  men  and 
women, which indicates risk aversion. The estimated degree of risk aversion is low for men 
and higher, but still moderate, for women. The estimates are consistent with Holt and Laury 
(2002),  who  reported  a  range  for  the  CRRA  coefficient  around  0.3-0.5.  The  difference 
between the estimated degrees of risk aversion for men and women is statistically significant. 
A Wald test rejects equality of the r parameters at the 10 % confidence level (p-value = 
0.0681), based on the robust standard errors reported, and at the 5 % level (p-value = 0.0275) 
based on non-robust standard errors. The finding that women are more risk averse than men is 
consistent with the literature, as mentioned in the introduction. 
The  coefficient  of  the  risk  adjusted  differential  between  net  income  from  self-
employment and from dependent employment a is significant in all models and positive in the 
models of entry into self-employment and negative in the models of exit. The four models 
thus  consistently  confirm  the  hypothesis  that  a  higher  risk  adjusted  net  income  in  self-
employment in comparison to dependent employment induces people both to become and to 
remain self-employed.   20 
4.3  Sensitivity Analysis 
This section assesses the sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to potentially critical 
assumptions made. Table A 5 in Appendix A shows the crucial risk aversion parameter r with 
its  robust  standard  error  resulting  from  different  specifications  of  the  transition  models, 
separately for men and women. The baseline estimation results are redisplayed in the first 
rows  for  reference.  The  results  indicate  that  r  is  robust  to  the  exclusion  of  potentially 
endogenous variables (row 2), a more flexible specification of the baseline hazard (row 3), a 
different  definition  of  the  dependent  variable,  where  transitions  into  part-time  self-
employment, or dependent employment, respectively, are additionally counted as a positive 
outcome (row 5), and the assumption of a real interest rate of 2 % instead of 5 % (row 6). If a 
probit instead of logit specification is used, the estimated degree of risk aversion is somewhat 
higher for men and considerably higher for women (row 4). Higher risk aversion for women 
also results under the assumption of a real interest rate of 8 % (row 7). The difference in risk 
aversion between men and women may thus rather be underestimated than overestimated in 
the main specification, and risk aversion may  play  a larger role in explaining the  gender 
differential in the self-employment rates. The standard error of women’s r also increases in 
these  two  specifications,  however.  The  lower  estimated  value  in  the  main  specification 
remains within the 95 % confidence interval of the estimate reported in row (7), but not of 
that reported in row (4). 
When instead of annuities over the individually remaining years of economic activity 
only the expected value and variance of net income in the next year are used in the transition 
models (row 8), r  becomes insignificant for both genders, with a very large standard error for 
men. As argued in section 3.3, it seems unlikely that agents only look at next year’s income 
prospects  when  deciding  to  make  a  transition  between  dependent  employment  and  self-
employment, and it would be irrational; thus, this specification may not be very informative.   21 
4.4  Decomposition of the Gender Gap in the Transition Rates 
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  decompose  the  differentials  between  the  female  and  male 
transition rates into components explained by different endowments, as represented by the 
variables, by the higher risk aversion estimated for women, and by differences in the other 
estimated coefficients. The familiar Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973) is adapted in three ways. First, the variation used here takes account of the 
nonlinearity of the estimated transition models, similarly to Fairlie (1999, 2007), and Bauer 
and Sinning (2008). The observed transition rates  Y , i.e. the proportion of those making a 
transitions in the subsamples, are very close to the average predicted transition probabilities 
ˆ Y : The relative deviation of  ˆ Y  from Y  is 0.013 % for the male and 0.755 % for the female 
entry rate, and 0.001 % for the male and female exit rates. A nonlinear decomposition of the 
gender differentials in the average transition rates into two components can thus be written as 
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , , , ,
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∑ ∑   (19) 
Ng is the sample size for gender gÎ{M;F}, Xi is the vector of variables (mi si
2 xi´ di),  ˆg r  is the 
risk parameter,  ˆ
g b  is the vector of the remaining coefficients ( 1 2 3 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ a b d d d ¢ )g estimated on the 
sub-sample of gender g, including a constant, and  ˆ ˆ ˆ , , i g g Y X b r  is the predicted transition 
probability  for  an  individual  with  characteristics  Xi,  using  the  model  with  the  estimated 
coefficients  ˆg r  and  ˆ
g b . The second summand in square brackets in the expression above is 
the contribution of the variables to the gender gap, and the first is the contribution of the 
coefficients. 
A well-known issue is whether the coefficients for men or women should be used in the 
second summand to assess the  contribution of the variables  (index problem). The second   22 
adaptation of the decomposition technique is that I follow Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and use 
the coefficients  ˆP r  and  ˆ
P b  from an estimation of the transition models on the pooled sample 
of men and women instead. The point estimate of the coefficient of CRRA  ˆP r  based on the 
pooled sample is 0.3779 (robust standard error: 0.0354).
25 As expected, the estimate lies in 
between those obtained separately for men and women. Now the first summand is split into 
two by first calculating the difference in the predictions between  ˆM r , ˆ
M b  and  ˆP r , ˆ
P b  and 
then between  ˆP r , ˆ
P b  and  ˆF r , ˆ
F b . 
Finally,  as  the  third  and  novel  variation  I  further  decompose  the  contribution  of  the 
coefficients  into  the  contribution  of  the  risk  attitude  r  and  the  contribution  of  the  other 
coefficients b. Using a shorter notation, a complete decomposition can be written as 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ , , , , , , , ,
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(20) 
The 3
rd summand is the contribution of the variables, the sum of the 2
nd and 4
th summands is 
the  contribution  of  the  risk  attitude,  and  the  sum  of  the  1
st  and  last  summands  is  the 
contribution of the remaining coefficients. 
Table 2 presents the decomposition of the entry rate (left three columns) and the exit rate 
(right  three  columns)  without  weighting.  Columns  1  and  4  show  the  average  predicted 
transition rates in the entry and the exit models. Columns 2 and 5 give the differences which 
correspond  to  the  five  summands  in  equation  (20),  and  columns  3  and  4  present  these 
differences  relative  to  the  total  gap  in  the  male  and  female  transition  rates.  The  relative 
difference reported in row 4 is the contribution of the variables to the gender gap, the sum of 
rows 3 and 5 is the contribution of the estimated risk aversion parameter, and the sum of rows 
                                                 
25 The full estimation results are available from the author upon request.   23 
2 and 6 is the contribution of the other coefficients. Especially in the exit model, some of the 
decomposition steps change the transition rate into the direction opposite to the overall gender 
difference, which means the contributions of these steps to the gender gap are negative. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 summarizes the decomposition of the gender differentials in the entry and exit 
rates into the three components mentioned. Additionally to the unweighted decomposition, the 
two columns to the right present the results obtained by weighting the predicted transition 
rates using population weights (see section 3.2). In both the unweighted and the weighted 
analysis, only about 2 % of women’s lower entry rate are explained by their higher estimated 
degree of risk aversion. About 10 % (17 %) are explained by the variables without (with) 
weighting. The remaining 88 % (82 %) are due to differences in the other coefficients: the 
same endowments make self-employment less attractive for women than they do for men. 
This may partly reflect creditor or consumer discrimination. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
The variables, which together explain between about 10 % and 17 % of the gender gap 
(without / with weighting), include the estimated annuities of the  expected value and the 
variance of earnings in both employment states. These earnings variables may themselves 
partly  be  influenced  by  discrimination  against  women.  In  fact,  standard  Blinder-Oaxaca 
decompositions of the gender differentials in estimated earnings (using coefficients from a 
pooled regression as in Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994; unweighted) yield that only 39.9 % of the 
gap in earnings from dependent employment and 34.2 % of the gap in earnings from self-
employment are explained by observed variables. An analogous decomposition shows that 
just 26.1 % (22.2 %) of the gender differential in the variance of earnings from dependent 
employment (self-employment) are explained by the variables. Taking this into account, even 
less of the gender gap in the entry rate can be attributed to gender differences in endowments. 
The 17 % obtained from the weighted decomposition thus represent an upper bound.   24 
In contrast to the differential in the entry rate, the higher female average exit rate out of 
self-employment is explained by women’s higher estimated degree of risk aversion, either 
completely (in the unweighted decomposition) or at least to the largest part (in the weighted 
case). Given the gender difference in risk aversion alone, the differential in the exit rate would 
even be larger than the differential actually observed. This is compensated for by the other 
coefficients, which have the opposite effect and decrease the women’s exit rate. While these 
general results are obtained both from the unweighted and the weighed decompositions, the 
effect of the risk attitude is much stronger in the unweighted analysis. Here, given the gender 
difference in risk aversion alone, the differential in the exit rate would be more than three 
times as large as the differential actually observed. 
For  the  interpretation  of  this  large  relative  effect  it  is  important  to  consider  that  the 
gender differential in the exit rate is relatively small, however: The unweighted female exit 
rate is only 4.3 % higher than the male exit rate, whereas the unweighted female entry rate is 
36.3 % lower (this is calculated from the figures in the first and last rows of columns 1 and 4 
in Table 2). As the gender differential in the entry rate is much larger in relative terms than 
the differential in the exit rate, the results from the decomposition of the entry rate are more 
relevant for the explanation of the gender gap in the self-employment rate. The relatively 
small  gender  differential  in  the  exit  rate  may  also  explain  why  the  estimates  from  the 
decomposition  of  the  exit  rate  are  less  robust  to  weighting  than  the  estimates  from  the 
decomposition of the entry rate. 
5  Conclusion 
The self-employment rate among women is much lower than among men in almost all OECD 
countries. In Germany, women’s lower self-employment rate is due both to a lower entry rate 
and – to a smaller extent – to a higher exit rate. This paper investigated the role played by 
gender differences in the degree of risk aversion. The gender differentials in the transition   25 
rates between dependent employment and self-employment, and vice versa, were decomposed 
into components explained by 1. differences in observable endowments, 2. differences in the 
econometrically  estimated  coefficient  of  constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA),  and  3. 
differences in other estimated coefficients. 
To  achieve  this,  a  structural  microeconometric  model  of  the  transition  probabilities 
including the parameter of CRRA was estimated. The estimation results from this model show 
that  not  only  the  expected  value,  but  also  the  variance  of  an  individual’s  future  after-tax 
income  play  a  significant  role  in  the  choice  between  self-employment  and  dependent 
employment.  Higher  expected  net  earnings  in  self-employment  relative  to  dependent 
employment attract people to become and to remain self-employed, whereas higher variance 
discourages them from choosing this option. The estimated coefficient of CRRA indicates that 
men and women are moderately risk averse, and women are significantly more risk averse 
than men. The estimated structural transition model was then used as the basis for a non-linear 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. 
The result from the decomposition of the gender differential in the entry rate into self-
employment  is  that  only  about  2 %  of  the  gap  are  due  to  women’s  higher  level  of  risk 
aversion. Considering potential discrimination effects on expected earnings, less than 17 % of 
the differential are explained by gender differences in endowments. The largest part of the 
lower female entry rate thus remains unexplained and may potentially, at least in part, be 
attributed to creditor or consumer discrimination against self-employed women. 
In contrast to the differential in the entry rate, the largest part of the higher exit rate of 
women  out  of  self-employment  is  explained  by  their  higher  level  of  risk  aversion.  The 
remaining coefficients even reduce the gender gap. The gender differential in the exit rate is 
much  smaller  in  relative  terms  than  the  differential  in  the  entry  rate,  however,  and  thus 
contributes less to the gender differential in the self-employment rate.   26 
Understanding the causes of the low female self-employment rate is important for the 
design of appropriate policies. Policymakers may aim to increase female entrepreneurship for 
efficiency reasons, if discrimination against women leads to a sub-optimal allocation. If not 
discrimination, but gender differences in risk preferences lead to the unequal self-employment 
rate, government intervention may not be required for efficiency reasons, but may still be 
desired to reach equality targets. 
As women’s higher risk aversion and gender differences in endowments only explain a 
small part of the lower female entry rate into self-employment, the results from this analysis 
suggest that creditor and consumer discrimination may hinder female entry. State-subsidized 
credit schemes for female-led businesses in the start-up phase may thus facilitate the step into 
self-employment  for  women.  As  gender  differences  in  risk  aversion  are  found  to  be  the 
primary reason for the higher female exit rate, further subsidized credit schemes targeted at 
already established female-led enterprises do not seem to be required. If policymakers want to 
reduce the female exit rate, risk-sharing offered by the government, e.g. through taxation, may 
be a suitable instrument to encourage female entrepreneurs to stay self-employed. Comparing 
the instruments, subsidized credit schemes for female-led start-up firms are more likely to 
increase women’s self-employment rate, as the gender differential in the entry rate is much 
larger in relative terms, and are also more likely to increase efficiency. Further research is 
necessary to investigate how much of the large unexplained part of the gender differential in 
the entry rate found here is due to creditor and consumer discrimination.   27 
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Tables 
Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results of Structural Transition Probabilities 
Variable /  
Structural Parameter 
Coefficient / Estimated Value 
 (Robust Standard Error) 
  Men  Women 








CRRA coefficient r    0.3215    0.5560 
    (0.0376)***    (0.1229)*** 
a  0.2894  -0.1728  0.2646  -0.1040 
  (0.0200)***  (0.0173)***  (0.0385)***  (0.0312)*** 
duration  -0.2756  -0.4455  -0.3490  0.0075 
  (0.0555)***  (0.0716)***  (0.1010)***  (0.1216) 
dur_sq  0.0139  0.0210  0.0223  -0.0052 
  (0.0047)***  (0.0051)***  (0.0089)**  (0.0105) 
dur_cu  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0004  0.0001 
  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)***  (0.0002)**  (0.0002) 
highschool  0.1032  -0.2798  0.4444  0.0495 
  (0.2137)  (0.2684)  (0.2502)*  (0.3361) 
apprenticeship  0.6657  1.0243  -0.0559  0.0689 
  (0.1800)***  (0.2986)***  (0.2452)  (0.3495) 
highertechncol  1.0809  0.8438  0.2796  -0.6303 
  (0.1971)***  (0.3196)***  (0.2826)  (0.4488) 
university  0.5989  -0.1926  0.0924  -0.8285 
  (0.2201)***  (0.3051)  (0.2873)  (0.4169)** 
age_bgn  0.0179  -0.1912  0.0314  -0.0799 
  (0.0509)  (0.0695)***  (0.0775)  (0.0896) 
age_bgn_sq  -0.0010  0.0018  -0.0007  0.0004 
  (0.0007)  (0.0009)**  (0.0010)  (0.0011) 
workexp_bgn  0.0123  -0.0115  0.0239  0.0022 
  (0.0240)  (0.0317)  (0.0230)  (0.0263) 
unemexp  0.0507  -0.0932  0.1650  -0.1180 
  (0.0663)  (0.1048)  (0.0928)*  (0.1718) 
nchild  0.0802  0.0953  0.0038  -0.3243 
  (0.0587)  (0.0963)  (0.1477)  (0.1866)* 
east  0.1916  0.1556  0.3899  0.5226 
  (0.1571)  (0.2232)  (0.2694)  (0.3406) 
north  -0.1321  -0.3483  -0.1246  -0.3544 
  (0.1986)  (0.2972)  (0.4320)  (0.5182) 
south  -0.3420  -0.1349  0.0698  -0.3054 
  (0.1549)**  (0.2230)  (0.3000)  (0.4386) 
otherhhinc  -0.0023  0.0015  -0.0141  0.0025 
  (0.0036)  (0.0013)  (0.0068)**  (0.0063) 
spouse_empl  0.2232  -0.1332  -0.0910  -0.5214 
  (0.1515)  (0.2130)  (0.2739)  (0.3939) 
spouse_selfempl  0.5500  0.0276  1.4605  1.2113 
  (0.4150)  (0.3554)  (0.3186)***  (0.3188)*** 
constant  -4.6632  2.0283  -5.3738  -0.0682 
  (0.9053)***  (1.3404)  (1.3391)***  (1.8956) 
Wald c
2    130.967    47.111 
log likelihood    -2110.833    -845.224 
N    44440    23067 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 10% / 5% / 1% level, based on heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 1984-2005, full-time self-employed and dependently 
employed individuals. 
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Table 2: Decomposition of Gender Differential in Transition Rates (%, unweighted) 
      Dep. employment to self-employment  Self-employment to dep. employment 
      Average 
predicted 
entry rate 
Difference  Difference in 





Difference  Difference in 
percent of the 
total difference 
(1) Men, model: men  0.9379      7.5446     
(2) Men, model: pooled,   
risk parameter: men  0.8267  0.1112  32.70  7.3052  0.2394  -73.41 
(3) Men, model: pooled  0.8312  -0.0045  -1.32  7.6252  -0.3200  98.13 
(4) Women, model: pooled  0.7978  0.0334  9.82  7.6207  0.0045  -1.38 
(5) Women, model: pooled, 
risk parameter: women  0.7872  0.0106  3.13  8.4316  -0.8109  248.62 
(6) Women, model: women  0.5979  0.1892  55.67  7.8708  0.5608  -171.95 
   Total     0.3400  100.00     -0.3262  100.00 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 1984-2005, full-time self-employed and dependently employed 
individuals. 
Table 3: Decomposition of Gender Differential in Transition Rates (%) – Summary 
  Unweighted  Weighted 
Contribution to the gender gap 
of…  
Dep. empl. to self-
employment 
Self-employment 
to dep. empl. 
Dep. empl. to self-
employment 
Self-employment 
to dep. empl. 
Variables  9.82  -1.38  16.63  88.29 
Estimated coeff. of risk aversion  1.81  346.74  1.71  126.93 
Other coefficients  88.37  -245.36  81.66  -115.22 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 




































































































































































































































































































Source: Annual Labour Force Statistics, OECD (2009).   34 
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Figure 3: Predicted Hourly Earnings of Employees (Euros) 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Estimation Results 
Table A 1: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Employment State Probabilities 
Variable  Marginal Effect on Outcome Probability 
(Robust Standard Error) 
  Men  Women 








highschool  0.0057  -0.0303  0.0069  0.0258 
  (0.0026)*  (0.0057)***  (0.0014)***  (0.0072)*** 
apprenticeship  -0.0037  0.0864  -0.0027  0.0956 
  (0.0022)  (0.0042)***  (0.0010)**  (0.0056)*** 
highertechncol  0.0147  0.0546  0.0044  0.0927 
  (0.0028)***  (0.0040)***  (0.0013)***  (0.0072)*** 
university  0.0005  0.0761  0.0115  0.2503 
  (0.0027)  (0.0043)***  (0.0019)***  (0.0094)*** 
age_bgn  0.0120  -0.0002  0.0014  -0.0062 
  (0.0010)***  (0.0016)  (0.0004)***  (0.0022)** 
age_bgn_sq  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0000  -0.0003 
  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
workexp_bgn  -0.0001  0.0082  0.0017  0.0261 
  (0.0005)  (0.0009)***  (0.0002)***  (0.0011)*** 
workexp_bgn_sq  -0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0000  -0.0002 
  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
unemexp  -0.0140  -0.0576  -0.0054  -0.1013 
  (0.0013)***  (0.0025)***  (0.0009)***  (0.0035)*** 
unemexp_sq  0.0005  0.0034  0.0001  0.0058 
  (0.0001)***  (0.0003)***  (0.0002)  (0.0004)*** 
german  -0.0005  0.0551  0.0017  -0.0121 
  (0.0037)  (0.0070)***  (0.0020)  (0.0096) 
disabled  -0.0208  -0.0655  -0.0098  0.0057 
  (0.0025)***  (0.0076)***  (0.0011)***  (0.0102) 
nchild  0.0046  -0.0175  -0.0034  -0.2187 
  (0.0008)***  (0.0017)***  (0.0006)***  (0.0031)*** 
married  -0.0117  0.1383  -0.0055  -0.1883 
  (0.0022)***  (0.0047)***  (0.0012)***  (0.0057)*** 
fatherse  0.0721  -0.0960  0.0083  0.0270 
  (0.0048)***  (0.0071)***  (0.0019)***  (0.0081)*** 
Fed. state dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
constant  YES  YES  YES  YES 
LR c
2  21190.336    33341.201   
Pseudo R
2  0.252    0.224   
N  54157    63164   
The table shows the marginal effects on the probabilities of the outcome categories “full-time self-employment” 
and “full-time dependent employment”. For dummy variables, the change in the probability caused by a discrete 
change  from  0  to  1  are  reported.  The  categories  “part-time  self-employment”  and  “part-time  dependent 
employment” are not shown for brevity and available upon request. The base category is “unemployment / 
inactivity”. Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: Own calculations based 
on the SOEP 1984-2004. 
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Table A 2: Regression of Hourly Gross Earnings 
Variable  Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
  Men  Women 
  Self-employed  Dependently 
employed 
Self-employed  Dependently 
employed 
duration  0.594  0.315  -0.305  0.358 
  (0.196)**  (0.024)***  (0.378)  (0.023)*** 
dur_sq  -0.021  -0.005  0.039  -0.013 
  (0.014)  (0.002)**  (0.033)  (0.002)*** 
dur_cu  0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)*** 
highschool  -1.236  2.058  0.774  2.118 
  (0.938)  (0.123)***  (1.170)  (0.087)*** 
apprenticeship  -1.715  0.166  -1.941  0.627 
  (1.075)  (0.087)  (1.209)  (0.072)*** 
highertechncol  -3.561  1.110  -2.020  0.726 
  (1.066)***  (0.107)***  (1.096)  (0.108)*** 
university  6.652  3.888  1.303  2.634 
  (0.990)***  (0.147)***  (1.383)  (0.106)*** 
age_bgn  0.367  0.179  0.216  0.095 
  (0.361)  (0.041)***  (0.397)  (0.036)** 
age_bgn_sq  -0.004  0.001  -0.004  -0.001 
  (0.005)  (0.001)*  (0.005)  (0.001) 
workexp_bgn  0.176  -0.111  -0.067  0.074 
  (0.120)  (0.019)***  (0.283)  (0.016)*** 
workexp_bgn_sq  -0.001  -0.002  0.004  -0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.001)***  (0.006)  (0.001)** 
unemexp  -1.819  -1.418  -2.993  -0.877 
  (0.484)***  (0.059)***  (0.887)***  (0.075)*** 
unemexp_sq  0.105  0.103  0.449  0.069 
  (0.053)*  (0.008)***  (0.226)*  (0.016)*** 
german  -2.060  0.589  4.115  0.824 
  (1.185)  (0.094)***  (1.812)*  (0.091)*** 
disabled  0.095  -1.015  -2.987  -0.466 
  (1.195)  (0.116)***  (2.765)  (0.135)*** 
Fed. state dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
l  -1.966  -0.642  -2.082  -0.407 
  (1.475)  (0.230)**  (3.789)  (0.093)*** 
constant  7.217  5.523  -1.275  4.833 
  (9.361)  (0.704)***  (15.583)  (0.542)*** 
R
2  0.186  0.370  0.285  0.313 
N  3075  41365  991  22076 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: Own calculations based on the 
SOEP 1984-2005, full-time self-employed and dependently employed individuals. 
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Table A 3: Regression of Hourly Gross Earnings Variance 
Variable  Coefficient 
(Robust Standard Error) 
  Men  Women 
  Self-employed  Dependently 
employed 
Self-employed  Dependently 
employed 
duration  -0.033  -0.019  -0.073  0.011 
  (0.033)  (0.009)*  (0.071)  (0.013) 
dur_sq  0.004  0.003  0.005  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.001)***  (0.006)  (0.001) 
dur_cu  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)***  (0.000)  (0.000) 
highschool  -0.093  0.269  0.177  0.347 
  (0.137)  (0.039)***  (0.296)  (0.046)*** 
apprenticeship  -0.162  -0.031  -0.368  -0.041 
  (0.122)  (0.034)  (0.217)  (0.042) 
highertechncol  -0.306  0.209  -0.225  0.129 
  (0.145)*  (0.039)***  (0.219)  (0.049)** 
university  0.672  0.512  0.126  0.523 
  (0.134)***  (0.046)***  (0.267)  (0.053)*** 
age_bgn  -0.011  0.037  -0.051  0.028 
  (0.054)  (0.014)**  (0.079)  (0.017) 
age_bgn_sq  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
workexp_bgn  0.008  -0.012  0.004  0.020 
  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.046)  (0.009)* 
workexp_bgn_sq  0.000  -0.001  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000)**  (0.001)  (0.000) 
unemexp  -0.244  -0.245  -0.098  -0.262 
  (0.102)*  (0.026)***  (0.174)  (0.032)*** 
unemexp_sq  0.025  0.014  0.057  0.017 
  (0.008)**  (0.003)***  (0.025)*  (0.005)*** 
german  -0.723  0.199  -0.978  0.239 
  (0.180)***  (0.044)***  (0.345)**  (0.064)*** 
disabled  0.069  -0.051  -0.218  0.037 
  (0.309)  (0.049)  (0.537)  (0.077) 
Fed. state dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES 
l  -0.366  0.502  -0.451  0.298 
  (0.210)  (0.092)***  (0.556)  (0.049)*** 
constant  4.391  -0.359  3.654  -0.656 
  (1.336)**  (0.232)  (2.432)  (0.292)* 
R
2  0.115  0.075  0.162  0.068 
N  3075  41365  991  22076 
Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 5% / 1% / 0.1% level. Source: Own calculations based on the 
SOEP 1984-2005, full-time self-employed and dependently employed individuals. 
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Table A 4: Regression of Average Tax Rates 
Variable  Coefficient 
  (Robust Standard Error) 
grossinc_yr  0.052 
  (0.002)*** 
grossinc_yr_sq  -0.002 
  (0.000)*** 
grossinc_yr_cu  1.45e-5 
  (0.000)*** 
self-employed  -0.034 
  (0.002)*** 
married  -0.046 
  (0.001)*** 
married x female  0.070 
  (0.001)*** 
nchild  -0.017 
  (0.000)*** 
disabled  -0.008 
  (0.002)*** 
year dummies  YES 
constant  0.241 
  (0.003)*** 
mean avg. tax rate  0.328 
R
2  0.250 
N  83101 
Stars  (***)  indicate  significance  at  the  0.1%  level.  Source:  Own 
calculations based on the SOEP 1984-2004. 
 
Table A 5: Robustness of the Risk Aversion Parameter in the Transition Model 
  Specification  Men  Women 
     CRRA 
coeff. r 
Std Error  CRRA 
coeff. r 
Std Error 
(1) Main estimation  0.3215  (0.0376)***  0.556  (0.1229)*** 
(2) Exclusion of number of children, other household 
income and spouse's employment state  0.321  (0.0378)***  0.4965  (0.0810)*** 
(3) Baseline hazard is a polynomial of forth degree  0.3209  (0.0375)***  0.5571  (0.1245)*** 
(4) Probit specification of the hazard rate  0.4098  (0.0403)***  1.1169  (0.2077)*** 
(5) Transitions to part-time self-employment / 
dependent empl. counted as positive outcome  0.3266  (0.0368)***  0.5309  (0.0877)*** 
(6) Real interest rate 2 %  0.3072  (0.0368)***  0.5254  (0.0886)*** 
(7) Real interest rate 8 %  0.3376  (0.0398)***  1.1305  (0.3346)*** 
(8) Consideration of next year's expected income only 
instead of lifetime annuity  -0.2505  (0.4041)  -0.0042  (0.0071) 
 Stars (* / ** / ***) indicate significance at the 90% / 95% / 99% level. Source: Full-time self-employed and 
dependently employed individuals in the SOEP 1984-2005.   40 
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definitions 
Table B 1: Number of Person-Year Observations in the Different Employment States 
Employment State Category  Men  Women 
Unemployed/inactive  7976  26244 
Full-time employed  41365  22076 
Part-time employed  1460  13089 
Full-time self-employed  3075  991 
Part-time self-employed  281  764 
Total  54157  63164 
Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 1984-2004. 
 
Table B 2: Definition of Variables 
Variable  Definition 
duration  Duration of current spell (self-employment or employment) in years. For left-censored 
spells, the duration since the last job change is reported, which may be shorter than the 
overall duration in the current employment state if somebody switched jobs within one of 
these states before entering the panel 
highschool  Dummy indicating a high school degree ("Fachhochschulreife" or "Abitur") 
apprenticeship  Dummy for having finished an apprenticeship 
highertechnical  Dummy for having finished a higher technical college or similar 
university  Dummy indicating a university degree 
age_bgn  Age at the beginning of the current spell in self-employment or dependent employment 
workexp_bgn  Years of work experience at the beginning of the current spell 
unemexp  Years of unemployment experience 
nchild  Number of children under 17 in the household 
east  Dummy indicating residence in one of the 5 new eastern federal states or East Berlin 
north  Dummy indicating residence in one of the northern federal states (Schleswig Holstein, 
Lower Saxony, Hamburg, or Bremen) 
south  Dummy indicating residence in one of the southern federal states (Baden-Wuerttemberg 
or Bavaria) 
female  Dummy for women 
otherhhinc  Income of other individuals living in the same household per year (in € 1000) 
married  Dummy for married individuals 
spouse_empl  Dummy for married individuals whose spouse is dependently employed and living in the 
same household 
spouse_selfempl  Dummy for married individuals whose spouse is self-employed and living in the same 
household 
spouse_notempl  Dummy for married individuals whose spouse is unemployed or inactive and living in the 
same household 
german  Dummy indicating German nationality 
disabled  Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals 
fatherse  Dummy for individuals whose father is/was self-employed 
grossinc_yr  Gross income per year (in € 10 000) 
self-employed  Dummy indicating self-employment 
x_sq indicates the square and x_cu the cube of variable x. Dummy variables are equal to one if the condition 
holds and zero otherwise.  
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Table B 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Self-Employed 
    Men  Women 
Variable  Unit  Mean  Std Deviation  Mean  Std Deviation 
duration   years  7.641  7.589  6.226  6.392 
highschool  binary  0.349    0.306   
apprenticeship  binary  0.434    0.364   
highertechncol  binary  0.292    0.287   
university  binary  0.306    0.341   
age_bgn  years  36.838  9.204  38.532  9.567 
workexp_bgn  years  13.581  9.680  13.911  9.352 
unemexp  years  0.312  0.805  0.363  0.798 
nchild  number  0.824  1.009  0.592  0.840 
east  binary  0.228    0.386   
north  binary  0.155    0.127   
south  binary  0.264    0.210   
otherhhinc (yr)  € 1000  12.328  30.524  15.907  20.437 
married  binary  0.724    0.719   
spouse_empl  binary  0.319    0.237   
spouse_selfempl  binary  0.074    0.154   
spouse_notempl  binary  0.127    0.046   
german  binary  0.945    0.964   
disabled  binary  0.035    0.015   
fatherse  binary  0.209    0.145   
transitions (N)    232    78   
transitions (rate)    0.075    0.079   
N    3075    991   
Dependently Employed 
    Men  Women 
Variable  Unit  Mean  Std Deviation  Mean  Std Deviation 
duration  years  9.915  8.559  8.110  7.611 
highschool  binary  0.215    0.200   
apprenticeship  binary  0.565    0.529   
highertechncol  binary  0.205    0.210   
university  binary  0.182    0.202   
age_bgn  years  31.043  9.402  30.692  9.284 
workexp_bgn  years  9.271  9.209  8.374  8.393 
unemexp  years  0.390  0.965  0.371  0.866 
nchild  number  0.779  0.992  0.387  0.696 
east  binary  0.244    0.358   
north  binary  0.127    0.116   
south  binary  0.286    0.243   
otherhhinc (yr)  € 1000  12.682  20.808  16.209  20.368 
married  binary  0.700    0.531   
spouse_empl  binary  0.283    0.264   
spouse_selfempl  binary  0.017    0.034   
spouse_notempl  binary  0.180    0.039   
german  binary  0.911    0.935   
disabled  binary  0.054    0.046   
fatherse  binary  0.066    0.082   
transitions (N)    388    133   
transitions (rate)    0.009    0.006   
N    41365    22076   
Standard deviations are given for continuous variables only. Source: Own calculations based on the SOEP 
1984-2004, full-time self-employed and dependently employed individuals. 
 